Two important decisions in designing markets for tradable emissions permits are whether to allow banking of permits (coupons) and whether to allow trading in entitlements to future permits (shares). Banking is predicted to reduce price instability when firms trade in a reconciliation market after the quantity of emissions has been determined. Tradable shares are a common feature in proposals for emissions trading in Canada. We conduct a laboratory experiment to investigate how bankable coupons and tradable shares affect efficiency and prices under uncertainty. Cognitive demands on the subjects are reduced by computerized advice on the optimal allocation of coupons across periods and the implied marginal values of coupons and shares. Banking, share trading and uncertainty conditions are introduced in a complete factorial design with three observations per cell. High efficiencies are observed across all treatments.
INTRODUCTION
Two important decisions in designing markets for tradable emissions permits are whether to allow banking and whether to allow trading in entitlements to future permits. Banking refers to the ability to carry unused emission permits forward from one compliance period to the next.
Banking is sometimes considered undesirable since it reduces the regulator's control over the temporal distribution of emissions. This could lead to a concentration of emissions in certain time periods, which would increase pollution damages if the damage function is convex. Banking is particularly desirable when firms cannot control emissions precisely during a compliance period.
In this case, they may arrive at the end of the compliance period with a surplus or deficit of permits. An emissions trading plan can provide for a reconciliation market in which firms clear these surpluses or deficits. This market may be unstable, however. If banking is not allowed, an excess supply of permits in the reconciliation period may lead to extremely low prices for permits while excess demand may drive prices very high [4, 5] .
Explicit trading in entitlements to future permits is a feature of several emission trading plans under discussion in Canada. These proposals distinguish between coupons and shares. A coupon gives permission to discharge a unit quantity of waste. A share represents an entitlement to a specified fraction of the total available coupons to be issued in future periods. For example, a firm holding 10 percent of the shares in an emissions trading market would receive 10 percent of the coupons issued in any year, even if the absolute number of coupons is variable. In a world of complete and perfect contingent future markets in coupons, shares would be redundant. But in the practical world of environmental regulation, shares may have some advantages in allowing more secure long term planning for firms acquiring or selling coupons and in providing an explicit method for allocating any future variation in aggregate allowable emissions.
Emissions trading plans under discussion in Canada typically provide both for trading in shares and for banking coupons 3 , while plans implemented in the United States tend not to provide a formal mechanism for trading entitlements and have, in at least one case, restricted banking. 4 Neither design feature has been fully investigated in the laboratory. Previous experiments have shown that markets with bankable coupons achieve somewhat lower efficiencies than those typically observed in markets with no intertemporal trading, perhaps because banking 
PREVIOUS LITERATURE
Considerable attention is being paid to the use of tradable emission permits to achieve environmental objectives at low cost [1, 2, 3, 9, 20] . Trading in permits (henceforth coupons) has three advantages over traditional methods of regulation. First, it promotes cost-efficiency achieving target emission reductions. Firms with low marginal abatement costs have an incentive to increase abatement in order to sell their coupons to firms with high abatement costs. The aggregate cost of the targeted abatement level is reduced as the cheapest abatement alternatives are exploited first. Second, the informational burden placed on regulators is reduced because the allocation of abatement effort across firms is determined through market forces rather than central direction. Third, the explicit price of coupons provides a continuing incentive for firms to develop and invest in new pollution control technologies. Most laboratory investigations into coupon trading have been related in one way or another to the EPA auction, especially to its revenue neutral features. Hahn [12] conducted an early investigation of revenue neutral auctions. Ledyard and Szakaly-Moore [15] study the performance of double auction and competitive revenue neutral auctions in the laboratory and find that the double auction institution yields higher market efficiencies and more stable prices than the competitive revenue neutral auction. Laboratory investigations specifically related to the EPA program were conducted at the Universities of Colorado [7] and Arizona [10, 11] . In general, these latter experiments showed that the proposed U.S. market mechanism, as implemented in the laboratory, achieved only about one half of the potential cost savings. The Arizona experiments showed incomplete arbitrage between the discriminative sealed bid auction and a computerized double auction market and some evidence of speculative bubbles in coupon prices. Subjects appeared to experience difficulty in banking coupons in both the Colorado and Arizona experiments, overbanking at Colorado and substantially underbanking at Arizona. A somewhat different line of experimentation was followed by Cason and Plott [6] , who showed that the revenue neutral auction mechanism implemented by the U.S. EPA contains a perverse incentive encouraging both sellers and buyers of coupons to submit bids below their true valuation of coupons.
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A particularly interesting investigation of the effect of uncertainty on emission trading markets was conducted in the context of the California RECLAIM program [4, 5] . reduced efficiency and that banking will be particularly important in the context of uncertainty.
Our goal in this paper is to investigate whether bankable coupons and tradable shares promote efficient exchange and price stability in a trading environment which both reflects uncertain control of emissions and reduces the cognitive demands placed on the subjects.
PROCEDURE Parameters
We construct a laboratory market in which eight subjects representing four types of firm trade coupons and shares. In every period each firm produces a fixed level of output and receives a fixed gross revenue. Gross emissions either are constant or vary randomly around an expected value. We refer to the latter as the case of uncertainty. Emissions may be abated at an increasing marginal cost. Net emissions equal gross emissions less abatement. Although abatement effort is chosen with certainty, net emissions are random when gross emissions are uncertain. We define complete abatement as the abatement effort required to reduce expected net emissions to zero.
Abatement cost savings, the difference between the cost of complete abatement and the cost of the actual abatement effort, rise at a diminishing rate as expected net emissions increase. To prevent their prior attitudes about environmental policy from influencing their behaviour, subjects are not told they will be trading emissions coupons, but rather that they are producing a product requiring a scarce input that is being rationed. They must surrender one coupon for each unit of input they actually use. Under conditions of certainty with no banking allowed, the marginal value of a coupon is equal to the marginal abatement cost savings shown in Table I . Because subjects participated in more than one session (see below), these induced values were varied by a scale factor ranging from one to four to prevent subjects becoming familiar with The marginal abatement cost savings induce a demand curve for net emissions and hence for coupons. The supply of coupons is 72 coupons in each of periods one to four and 36 coupons in each of the remaining eight periods. If agents bank optimally, 48 coupons will be redeemed each period. 7 In the case of uncertainty, agents may find that they used one more or one fewer units of input than they intended. Unexpected emissions must be covered by a coupon and so the supply of coupons available for redemption against expected use falls or rises each period by the sum of unexpected emissions in each period.
The Market Institution
Each experimental session consists of 12 periods, each period divided into six sub-periods or phases: share market, distribution, primary coupon market, production decision, production result, and reconciliation. In some treatments one or more phases are dropped.
During the share market phase subjects trade shares in a computerized double auction market. This phase only occurs under treatments with tradable shares. The share market phase is followed by the distribution phase, in which subjects receive coupons according to their current holdings of shares and the previously announced coupon dividend rate for that period. The distribution phase does not require any intervention from the subjects. During the primary coupon market phase, subjects again trade coupons in a computerized double-auction market.
During the production decision phase, subjects choose the number of units of the input to use and consequently the number of coupons they will need. In the production result phase, which occurs once all production plans have been submitted, subjects are informed of their actual input use and of the cash generated from current production. Under the uncertainty treatment, actual input use may differ from planned input use by an amount specified in advance by the investigators. In the present case these errors were drawn from a uniform distribution over the values (-1, 0, +1). 8 This feature models measurement error (as discussed by Carlson and Sholtz [5] ) or other errors in determining emissions. Such other errors might include unforeseen changes in output or changes in the availability of a substitute for the rationed input.
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During the reconciliation phase subjects trade coupons in a computerized double auction market to eliminate any coupon deficit or unwanted coupon surplus. We choose not to allow subjects to plan a coupon deficit during the production decision phase. Nevertheless, when uncertainty is present, actual use may exceed coupon holdings. In this case, the subject has a coupon deficit that must be cleared by purchasing more coupons. Similarly, subjects may deliberately incur a coupon surplus (in the production decision phase) that they choose to sell rather than to bank. The reconciliation period allows such subjects to trade.
In the coupon-redemption phase, subjects redeem the number of coupons corresponding to their actual input. Subjects with a coupon deficit pay a per-unit penalty which is greater than any other firm's marginal abatement cost. Subsequently, eliminating the deficit becomes a first charge against any coupons acquired in the following period. 9 The coupon-redemption phase does not require any intervention on the subject's part.
After the coupon-redemption phase the next period begins with a share market (if enabled) and a new distribution of coupons. There is no share market in the last period of the session. At the end of the session, subjects' earnings are converted to Canadian dollars and paid privately in cash.
The Planner and the Wizard
The market institution just described places substantial cognitive demands on the subjects.
When banking is allowed, the marginal value of a coupon is not determined directly by the schedule in Table I , but rather by the place in the schedule that the coupon would occupy if all current coupons and anticipated coupon dividends are allocated optimally over the remaining periods of the session. Similarly, the marginal value of a share is derived from the incremental value of the coupons it bears. These values are the output of simple, deterministic maximization problems. In the field, the operations research department of a participating firm could certainly compute these marginal values, given any trial holding of shares and coupons. Accordingly, we provide our subjects with a production planner that simulates an operations research department.
The production planner is shown in a window on the computer screen. Subjects can enter any trial quantity of coupons and shares. The production planner computes the abatement costEmissions Trading with Shares and Coupons page 10 minimizing allocation of current and anticipated coupons over time and reports the allocation, the corresponding profit, and the change from the current holdings.
Accordingly, we also provide subjects with advice from trading and production wizards.
The trading wizard uses the production planner to compute the current marginal value of coupons or shares, depending on the phase of the market, and displays its advice in a window during the primary coupon market, the reconciliation market, and share market phases of the period. The production wizard simply displays the operating profit-maximizing number of input units to use during the production decision phase. 10 We stress that the advice generated by the wizard requires no more information than one would expect to be available to firms in a naturally occurring market.
Computer Implementation
The The reconciliation market screen is essentially the same as the share and coupon market screens.
The wizard's advice is modified to account for the penalty imposed on coupon deficits.
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Experimental Design, Subjects, and Training
The treatment variables are the presence or absence of banking (B or NB), the presence or absence of trading in shares (S or NS), and the presence or absence of uncertainty concerning actual input use (U or NU). We choose a complete 2x2x2 factorial design with three observations per cell to achieve the maximum information from our experimental budget (see Table II ).
The sessions were run in July, August, November, and December 1994. In July, subjects were drawn from the summer population of the Hamilton region and for the most part were students. Twenty-four subjects were recruited for training. Subjects participated in four training sessions in which they were introduced first to oral and then to computerized double auction markets. Subjects then participated in a truncated oral version of the experimental market, in which they received shares and coupons in the form of slips of paper and in which they manually optimized coupon use over time. Finally, each subject participated in two short training markets using the experimental software. In November an additional thirty-two subjects were recruited for training from the McMaster University student population. These subjects participated in training sessions comparable to the July sessions. A total of 55 subjects participated in the sessions analysed in this paper. Subjects typically participated in from 2 to 5 experimental sessions. The results from twenty-four experimental sessions are reported here. The twelve uncertainty sessions were conducted after the twelve certainty sessions had been run. 12 Sessions lasted between two and three hours. Subjects were paid five Canadian dollars (C$) per session for arriving on time in addition to their earnings from the experiment. The latter ranged from C$5.32 to C$45.09 with a mean of C$21.55 per session.
Benchmarks
We assess market performance under four headings: system efficiency, trading volumes, price signals, and price stability. In general the point of reference is the coupon allocation that would minimize system abatement costs given the constraints imposed in any given treatment.
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Because the effective number of coupons available is less under uncertainty than in the case of certain control over emissions, minimum system abatement cost varies in the two cases.
We define twelve benchmarks for assessing system efficiency and prices (see Tables III   and IV) . The command-and-control benchmarks (CCC, CCU S , and CCU M ) represent the performance of the market if neither trading nor banking occurs. In the certainty case all coupons are used by the subjects to whom they are issued in the period when they are received. The uncertainty benchmarks (CCU S and CCU M ) adjust for the effective reduction in coupons available after the realization of random gross emissions. The system optimum command-and-control uncertainty benchmark (CCU S ) presumes that firms will allocate all their available coupons to production every period. The market equilibrium command-and-control uncertainty benchmark (CCU M ) assumes that firms face the same penalty structure under command-and-control that they do under the various banking and trading regimes. In this case, the high penalty for coupon deficits would induce risk-averse or risk-neutral firms to hold one coupon in reserve at the production decision phase against the possibility of a bad draw in the production result phase, reducing coupon use and raising system abatement cost. A further benchmark is the minimum number of trades required to achieve maximum available abatement cost savings under each of our experimental treatments. These are reported in Table V . In the baseline treatment of no banking and no share trading a minimum of 224 trades is required to obtain the maximum achievable cost saving. This falls to as few as sixteen share trades and eight coupon trades when both share trading and banking are permitted.
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Predictions
Our goal is to testbed institutions rather than to test theories, consequently our working hypotheses are based primarily on past experience. We have the following predictions.
Prediction 1: In the baseline treatment (NB/NS/NU) prices should converge quickly to TOC levels and adjusted net efficiency should be close to unity.
Because the baseline treatment of no banking, no tradable shares, and no uncertainty is essentially a conventional multiple-unit double auction, we expect that prices will converge fairly rapidly to the TOC benchmarks of L$14 and L$123 -L$136 and that net efficiency will be close to the TOC benchmark of 79.8 percent.
Prediction 2: Uncertainty in emissions should raise coupon inventories, reduce trading volumes and reduce system optimum net efficiency. There should be a high variance in reconcilation market prices when no banking is permitted.
Introducing uncertainty in emissions will expose subjects to penalties if they are caught with a coupon deficit. We predict that this will lead to higher inventories of coupons, a reluctance to trade, and reduced system optimum net efficiency compared with the baseline. The market equilibrium net efficiency concept incorporates predicted hoarding and should not be reduced. On the basis of the Caltech experiments [5, 6] we predict more price instability and reduced efficiency (relative to the baseline of NB/NS/NU) in the NB/NS/U and NB/S/U treatments. We expect these effects to be less pronounced in the banking treatment.
Prediction 3: Banking should reduce or eliminate the spread between early and late coupon prices, should eliminate volatile prices in the reconciliation period, and should increase net efficiency but not adjusted net efficiency.
Banking allows subjects to equate the marginal valuation of their coupons over time. If the final allocation is efficient the final prices should reflect the BTC and BTU benchmarks. When banking is allowed, the demand for reconciliation coupons can be met from other agents' coupon inventories, so there is likely to be competition in the market for coupons and prices will more closely conform to sellers' opportunity costs than to the extremely high marginal valuation of a trader who is short of coupons. This should eliminate the price instability predicted for reconciliation markets when no banking is allowed. Banking should increase net efficiency both because it allows for intertemporal substitution of coupons and because it discourages hoarding.
There is no need to withhold additional coupons as a reserve against a bad production result if the
agent is already planning to bank some coupons for future use. Since neither of these effects affect adjusted net efficiency we do not expect the latter to be increased by banking.
Prediction 4:
Share trading should reduce trading volumes and slightly increase both net and adjusted net efficiency. Coupon prices should not be affected.
Trading shares can substitute for plans to trade coupons later in a session. If shares are traded, fewer coupon trades will be necessary. In an environment with a complete set of futures markets for coupons, tradable shares would be redundant and would have no role in improving efficiency. Because the laboratory institution has no futures markets, however, share trading may play a role in reducing uncertainty about the terms of future exchanges. This may allow more accuracy in banking and allocation decisions, increasing net and adjusted net efficiency.
RESULTS
Summary statistics for efficiency, trading volume, prices and coupon use are reported in Tables VI to X. Table VI reports .14%, and 74.39%. 15 The first two observations, the lowest across all sessions, may be associated with one particular subject who by chance was assigned to both sessions and who was observed to concentrate on small trading gains rather than the redemption value of her coupons.
Below, we will report results both including and excluding these outlying sessions.
We also ran regressions of adjusted net efficiency (system optimum) and trading volume on all treatment variables, an experience index, and their interactions. 16 The experience index was introduced to control for the subject pool's increasing familiarity with the overall structure of the experiment. We sought an index that would be strictly increasing and concave in each The summary data in Tables VIII and IX indicate that coupon prices in the reconciliation market for NB/NS/U and the NB/S/U sessions are highly variable and generally much greater than coupon prices in the primary market. Contrary to our expectations, introducing uncertainty in emissions did not significantly affect trading volumes. Table VI shows that trading volumes actually increased in a number of cases and regression analysis confirms that uncertainty has no significant effect. 17 Mean coupon balances after period four were 62.67 and 115.33 in the noshares certainty and no-shares uncertainty treatments respectively, while they were 86.33 and 81.67 in the corresponding share treatments. 18 Mean net efficiency and mean adjusted net efficiency are higher under uncertainty than under certainty in all four contrasts shown in positive and statistically significant effect on both net and system optimum adjusted net efficiency when all sessions are included, but that the impact, while still positive, is not statistically significant when the outlying sessions are excluded. 19 We conclude that there is no evidence to suggest that uncertainty reduced the net efficiency of the coupon markets. Coupon price averages reported in Table VIII Table VIII show the introduction of share trading significantly reduces the standard deviation of coupon prices in both early and late stages (one-tailed exact randomization test, p=0.001).
Inspection of Table VI suggests 
DISCUSSION
Unlike experiments designed to test specific predictions, ours has been an exercise in testbedding. We wished to observe the performance of a proposed market institution under closely controlled changes in institutional arrangements in the hope of validating and improving upon the proposed design. In this light, Result 1 is perhaps the most important. We have shown that emissions trading plans can be implemented in a double auction laboratory environment and that they display a high degree of efficiency under a wide range of institutional choices. Despite the relative complexity of our procedure, we have achieved higher levels of efficiency than reported by Franciosi, Isaac, Pingry and Reynolds [11] and by Cronshaw and Brown Kruse [7] .
We attribute this partially to the more intensive training our subjects received and partly to assistance of the planner and wizard in guiding bidding and production decisions. itself, by complicating the decision-making environment. Our results show that the net effect of these three influences is definitely positive.
In contrast, our adjusted net efficiency results suggest that the third effect of banking may be negative. Subjects achieve a lower fraction of the higher potential gains from trade when banking is present than when it is absent. This may be due to the increased complexity of the banking environment. Result 3c, that banking increases trading volumes, provides some support for this conjecture. An increase in volume probably reflect subjects' attempts to increase profit by speculation and arbitrage. This might have reduced the adjusted net efficiency of the market.
Note, however, that the banking and experience interaction is significantly positive for both net and (system optimal) adjusted net efficiency, with or without outliers, suggesting that subjects experienced in the environment may benefit from banking (t > 1.875, p < 0.05 with at least 10 degrees of freedom on a one-tail test). In any case, any loss in adjusted net efficiency is more than compensated by banking's increasing the potential gains from trade.
Our results on share trading (Result 4) are quite remarkable. While most policy discussions of emissions trading plans envisage the development of futures markets in coupons, no previously reported laboratory experiments have implemented any form of trading future entitlements to coupons. We have shown that the introduction of shares improves the performance of the market even though it reduces trading volume. The gain in efficiency may be due to a reduction in the noise of price signals which accompanies a reduction of intramarginal trades. Our results suggest that formal trading of future entitlements to discharge permits may improve both the price revealing and efficiency properties of emissions trading plans.
More generally, our results suggest that although emissions trading markets are quite complex, high efficiencies can be obtained provided participants are well trained and supported by software that reduces the computational complexity of the market. They provide demonstrable support for emissions trading programs in comparison with other forms of regulation. This conclusion should be qualified, however, by noting that the high efficiencies are obtained in a double auction environment, a market institution known to be highly efficient in other applications. The efficiency properties of emissions trading programs might be compromised by using alternative market institutions, such as private negotiation.
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The experiment reported here represents only part of a continuing program of laboratory research into the properties of emissions trading markets. We plan to investigate systematically the effect of thin markets, large firms, and opportunities for strategic behaviour on the performance of these markets. We believe our results demonstrate the value of laboratory research in testbedding alternative designs for new economic institutions. Any practical innovation, such as emissions trading, requires many specific design decisions. Rather than choosing among these on the basis of a priori reasoning, testing the proposed design in a laboratory setting is entirely practical. Although extrapolation of laboratory results to the field is always difficult, these laboratory results offer useful guidance to policy makers engaged in the design of emissions trading programs.
